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**A. Uniqueness - U.S. and China are cooperating on space – Obama and Hu talks prove.**

Yasuhito **Fukushima** National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense **11** “An Asian perspective on the new US space policy: The emphasis on international cooperation and its relevance to Asia,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 3-6

The Obama administration is now trying to promote space cooperation with China. In November 2009 President **Obama** and China’s President, **Hu Jintao**, agreed to seek further discussions on space science cooperation and to initiate a dialogue on human spaceflight and space exploration.<sup>22</sup> The two leaders also welcomed reciprocal visits of the NASA administrator and his Chinese counterpart in 2010. This led to an official visit to China by NASA Administrator Charles Bolden in October 2010.<sup>23</sup> Bolden met his counterpart, Chen Qiufa, head of the China National Space Administration and visited Chinese human spaceflight related facilities.<sup>24</sup> In addition, both presidents shared the view that the two countries have common interests in the promotion of the peaceful use of space and agreed to take steps to enhance security in space. In pursuance of this the administration is seeking bilateral TCBMs with China. In October 2010 Defense Secretary Gates mentioned the need for strategic dialogue, which includes the issue of space security, in a meeting with China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie.<sup>25</sup>

**B. Link - U.S. space successes trade-off with Chinese space softpower.**

William **MARTEL** Nat’l Security Affairs @ Fletcher **AND** Toshi **YOSHIHARA** Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies @ US Naval War College **3** “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race” *Washington Quarterly* 26 (4) p. 21-23

As with the United States, China's objectives in space reflect broad commercial and military interests. From an economic perspective, the PRC views the exploitation of space as an integral part of its modernization drive, a top priority on Beijing's national agenda.<sup>8</sup> The rapid growth of China's economy in the past two decades has fueled investments in civilian space capabilities for several reasons. First, the explosive growth of the Chinese telecommunications market has spurred China to put both indigenous and foreign-made networks of communications satellites into orbit to keep pace with demand. Second, China's relatively inexpensive and increasingly reliable launchers have enabled Beijing to provide satellite-launching services to major international customers. Third, China recognizes that space research at the frontier of scientific knowledge promises innovative breakthroughs that are likely to strengthen its economic power and technological capabilities in the long term. As a result of these economic imperatives, the Chinese government has invested substantial resources in a robust space program. The PRC has developed a comprehensive scientific and industrial base capable of producing commercial space launchers and satellites. Chinese launch vehicles, which have become increasingly reliable and competitive in the international market, can place a variety of satellites—including those used for communications, remote sensing, photo reconnaissance, meteorology, and scientific research—into earth orbit. Furthermore, since 1999, China's involvement in preparations for manned space flight has attracted substantial international attention. In the case of national security, China's space program is shrouded in extreme secrecy, effectively shielding Chinese intentions and capabilities from outside observers. The PRC's official policy is to support the exploitation of space for economic, scientific, and cultural benefits while firmly opposing any militarization of space.<sup>9</sup> China has consistently warned that any testing, deployment, and use of space-based weapons will undermine global security and lead to a destabilizing arms race in space.<sup>10</sup> These public pronouncements have been primarily directed at the United States, especially after President George W. Bush declared in December 2001 that the United States was officially withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and accelerating U.S. efforts to develop a missile defense system. Some Chinese observers point to U.S. efforts to militarize space as evidence of the U.S. ambition to establish unilateral hegemony. For example, in 2001, Ye Zhenzhen, a correspondent for a major daily newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, stated that, "[a]fter the Cold War, even though the United States already possessed the sole strategic advantage over the entire planet, and held most advanced space technology and the most satellites, they still want to bring outer space totally under their own armed control to facilitate their smooth ascension as the world hegemon of the 21st century."<sup>11</sup> Diplomatically, China has urged the use of multilateral and bilateral legal instruments to regulate space activities, and Beijing and Moscow jointly oppose the development of space weapons or the militarization of space.<sup>12</sup> The Chinese leadership's opposition to weaponizing space provides evidence of China's growing concern that the United States will dominate space. The United States' avowed intention to ensure unrivaled superiority in space, as exemplified by the Rumsfeld Commission report, increasingly defines China's interests in space. Chinese anxieties about U.S. space power began with the 1991 Gulf War, when the PRC leadership watched with awe and dismay as the United States defeated Iraq with astonishing speed. Beijing recognized that the lopsided U.S. victory was based on superior command and control, intelligence, and communications systems, which relied heavily on satellite networks. Demonstrations of the United States' undisputed conventional military power in Bosnia; Kosovo; Afghanistan; and, most recently, Iraq further highlighted for Chinese officials the value of information superiority and space dominance in modern warfare. China's obsession with national prestige, which forms the backdrop for its commercial

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and military interests, also animates the country's space policy.<sup>13</sup> The PRC government has long boasted about its status as one of the few major space-faring nations. Indeed, its manned space program has been driven largely by the desire to become the third nation, after the United States and the former Soviet Union, to launch humans into space. Success in China's manned space program will confer a strong sense of national dignity and international status on the country, which are viewed as crucial elements to sustain the legitimacy of the Communist Party and replace its declining ideological appeal. This intangible yet powerful expression of Chinese nationalism partially explains why Beijing invests substantial national resources into its space program.<sup>14</sup> **Sources of Competition** At the same time that the United States views space dominance as a fundamental tenet of its national security, China evidently views U.S. space dominance as a major threat to its geostrategic interests. These views inevitably breed a zero-sum competition, in which one side perceives any loss as a gain for the other, and could ultimately prove destabilizing for Sino-U.S. relations.

**C. Impact - Chinese soft power prevents Taiwan independence**

Bates **Gill**, expert on Chinese foreign policy and the current director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, **and** Yanzhong **Huang**, Senior Fellow for Global Health and the Council on Foreign Relations, **06**

Survival, "Sources and limits of Chinese 'soft power'", June 2006,

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a747985000&fulltext=713240928,>]

A most intriguing example of China's soft power can be seen in its relations with Taiwan. In 2005, China launched a charm offensive against the politicians and people in the island by inviting opposition party leaders to visit the mainland, extending tuition benefits to Taiwanese studying at mainland universities, and, through a zero-tariff policy on imports of Taiwan's fruit, offering export incentive perks to farmers in the south of Taiwan (traditionally a pro-Taiwan independence stronghold). This 'hearts-and-minds' policy not only aims to reduce the perception of military threat from China, but also gives the Chinese government leverage to exercise influence in Taiwan's political culture and society, and politically marginalise Taiwan's independence-oriented president, Chen Shui-bian. In part as a result of Beijing's manoeuvres in recent years - and Chen's increasingly frustrated but worrisome responses - the possibility for Taiwan independence seems more distant and difficult. Chen Shiubian has increasingly alienated American supporters in Washington who do not appreciate what they see as his provocative political stance on cross-Strait issues. In the meantime, some 1 million, or about 5%, of the Taiwan population lives and works in China, and Taiwan business has invested more than \$100bn on the mainland. To be sure, some of China's influence over Taiwan is not so 'soft' at all: its military build-up along the Taiwan Strait, including the deployment of more than 700 ballistic missiles targeting the island, is a coercive threat aimed at thwarting independence moves by Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwan legislature's inability or unwillingness since 2001 to appropriate funding to purchase some \$18bn worth of weapons offered by Washington - a seemingly wise course in the face of China's growing military clout - is another indication of the mainland's ability to shape policy decisions on Taiwan in its favor. Beijing's influence still falls far short of achieving reunification with Taiwan. Indeed, the vast majority of Taiwan's citizens prefer a status quo which neither invites Chinese coercion (or worse) nor requires unification with the Communist mainland. But a combination of Beijing's soft- and hard-power instruments in recent years appears to have stemmed the political fortunes of the pro-independence movement in Taiwan for the time being. One could call this article a worst-case scenario for the new American century

## Inc

### **Taiwan Independence leads to nuclear war**

Victor **Corpus**, (Former Brigadier General, Former head of Army Intelligence), '06

[Asian Times, "If it comes to a shooting war", 8-20-06, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD20A03.html>]

One could call this article a worst-case scenario for the new American century. Why worst case? Because of the hard lessons from history. The Romans did not consider the worst-case scenario when Hannibal crossed the Alps with his elephants and routed them; or when Hannibal encircled and annihilated the numerically superior Roman army at the Battle of Cannae. **Taiwan declares independence!** China has anticipated and long prepared itself for this event. After observing "Operation Summer Pulse -04" when US aircraft carrier battle groups converged in the waters off China's coast in mid-July through August of 2004, Chinese planners began preparing to face its own worst-case scenario: the possibility of confronting a total of 15 carrier battle groups composed of 12 from America and three from its close British ally. China's strategists refer to its counter-strategy to defeat 15 or more aircraft carrier battle groups as the "assassin's mace" or *shashaujian*. After proper coordination with Russia and Iran and activating their previously agreed strategic plan, troops and weapon systems are pre-positioned. China then launches a missile barrage on Taiwan. Command and control nodes, military bases, logistics centers, vital war industries, government centers and air defense installations are simultaneously hit with short and medium range ballistic missiles armed with conventional, anti-radar, thermo baric and electro-magnetic pulse warheads. The assassin's mace: China's anti-satellite weapons Glee and ecstasy soon turn to shock as monitor screens suddenly go blank. Then all communication via satellites goes dead. China has drawn its second "trump card" (the assassin's mace) by activating its maneuverable "parasite" micro-satellites that have unknowingly clung to vital (NORAD) radar and communication satellites and have either jammed, blinded or physically destroyed their hosts. This is complemented by space mines that maneuver near adversary satellites and explode. Secret Chinese and Russian ground-based anti-satellite laser weapons also blind or bring down US and British satellites used for C4ISR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). And to ensure redundancy and make sure that the adversary C4ISR system is completely "blinded" even temporarily, hundreds of select Chinese and Russian information warriors (hackers) specifically trained to attack their adversary's C4ISR systems simultaneously launch their cyber offensive. For a few precious minutes, the US and UK advancing carrier battle groups are stunned and blinded by the "mace", ie, a defensive weapon used to temporarily blind a stronger opponent. But the word mace has another meaning; one which is deadlier and used in combination with the first. Missile barrage on advancing carrier battle groups A few seconds after the "blackout", literally hundreds of short and medium-range ballistic missiles (DF7/9/11/15s, DF4s, DF21X/As, some of which are maneuverable) pre-positioned on the Chinese mainland, and stealthy, sea-skimming and highly-accurate cruise missiles (YJ12s, YJ22s, KH31A/Ps, YJ83s, C301s, C802s, SS-N-22s, SS-NX-26/27s, 3M54s & HN3s) delivered from platforms on land, sea and air race toward their respective designated targets at supersonic speed. Aircraft carriers are allotted a barrage of more than two dozen cruise missiles each, followed by a barrage of short and medium-range ballistic missiles timed to arrive in rapid succession. Chinese and Russian missiles cocked Both Chinese and Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the two countries' extensive air defense systems have been coordinated and ready to respond in the event that the US and UK decide to retaliate with a nuclear attack. America crippled on three major fronts In just a few hours (or days) after the outbreak of general hostilities, America, the world's lone superpower, finds itself badly crippled militarily in three major regions of the world: East Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Impossible? Unfortunately, the answer is no. China now has the know-how and the financial resources to mass-produce hundreds, if not thousands, of Moskit, Yakhont and Granit-type supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and "squall"-type rocket torpedoes against which US and UK aircraft carriers and submarines have no known defense. Iran, on the other hand, already possesses the same supersonic cruise missiles that can destroy any ship in the Persia Gulf, including aircraft carriers. Russia and China, meanwhile, are operating on familiar grounds close to their territory, compared to the US, which needs to cross the Atlantic and Pacific to replenish troops and logistics. Grimmer scenarios There is a scenario grimmer than described above, however, and that is if strategic planners belonging to that elite group called the Project for the New American Century decide to launch a nuclear "first strike" against China and Russia and risk a mutually-assured destruction: 1) In defense of Taiwan ... or 2) In launching a "preventive war" to stop China from catching up economically and militarily. Or, if China decides to start an offensive against Taiwan with a one-megaton nuclear burst 40 kilometers above the center of the island. Or, if China and Russia decide to arm a number of their short and medium-range ballistic missiles and supersonic cruise missiles with tactical nuclear warheads in defending themselves against US and UK aircraft carrier battle groups. Land-attack versions of these supersonic cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads carried by stealthy Chinese and Russian submarines can also put American coastal cities at great risk to nuclear devastation. Strategic planners must also consider these worst-case possibilities.

## Uniq – China Space Softpower Now

### **China uses space as a means to develop soft power**

**Kevin Polpetter** Mr. Pollpeter has advanced Chinese language skills and holds a master's degree in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies. **o8** Strategic Studies Institute, "BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA'S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE" March 2008 pg 23-24

Similarly, Dr. Evan Medeiros writes that China's foreign policy goals are to "[maximize] its influence, leverage, and freedom of action while pursuing economic development to facilitate its reemergence as a great power."<sup>59</sup> China is implementing this strategy by establishing partnerships with other major powers in order to make China an attractive or indispensable actor whose interests must be taken into account. The second component of this strategy is an activist international agenda "designed to establish China's reputation as a responsible member of the international community and mute widespread concerns about how Beijing is likely to employ its growing capabilities, thus reducing the incentives for others to unite in opposition to China."<sup>60</sup> This strategy is also designed to protect China's core national interests against external threats as well as to shape the international system in which it operates. In addition, China's activities are to help usher in a multipolar world in which China would be one of several great powers.<sup>61</sup> In the short term, however, China's foreign policy is concentrated on developing national capabilities and international partners while avoiding the provocative consequences of a more straightforward hegemonic or balancing strategy.<sup>62</sup> This section examines the benefits of space power China uses to pursue these goals. <sup>24</sup> Space Power's Contribution to China's Comprehensive National Power. China's space program furthers its grand strategy ambitions by adding to China's comprehensive national power (CNP). Comprehensive national power is defined as the sum of a nation's economic, political, military, scientific and technological, educational, and cultural strength. CNP can be divided into hard power, such as military force, and soft power, such as economic and cultural influence. While space power is not a main contributor to China's CNP, it nevertheless is considered an important component. Space activities increase China's hard power by improving China's military capability and increase its soft power through its economic and political benefits.

### **China's space modernization programs peaceful**

**Kevin Polpetter** Mr. Pollpeter has advanced Chinese language skills and holds a master's degree in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies. **o8** Strategic Studies Institute, "BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA'S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE" March 2008 Pg. 22-23

China's burgeoning space program provides opportunities for China to use the benefits derived from space power to become a more influential and respected nation. The trappings of a robust space program are one hallmark of the great powers and China appears to be positioning itself as a great power with its space program. Indeed, as a COSTIND press release on its Eleventh Five-year Plan for space science states, "Our country is one of the few major space powers. China's position in the world and the country's security depend on the continued fast development of space technology."<sup>55</sup> This sentiment would be in accordance with some Chinese analysts who have advocated that China adopt a great power mentality in which China's interests mirror those of the major powers.<sup>56</sup> While there is no official Chinese "grand strategy," the Chinese leadership appears to have reached a consensus on the goals of China's foreign policy and how it should go about achieving them.<sup>57</sup> According to Avery Goldstein, China's grand strategy: aims to engineer China's rise to great power status within the constraints of a unipolar international system that 23 the United States dominates. It is designed to sustain the conditions necessary for continuing China's program of economic and military modernization as well as to minimize the risk that others, most importantly the peerless United States, will view the ongoing increase in China's capabilities as an unacceptably dangerous threat that must be parried or perhaps even forestalled. China's grand strategy, in short, aims to increase the country's international clout without triggering a counterbalancing reaction.<sup>58</sup>

## Uniq– China not threatened now

### **China no longer considers US as a threat - PLA reports prove**

Baohui **Zhang**, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, **11**

Asian Survey, "The Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationship," November 2, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311.pdf?acceptTC=true>,

The current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China's traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China's foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat. 41 As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that "the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars." 42 Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely. 43 Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China's view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China's strategic environment. After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon's 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as "a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies." As the analysis emphasizes, "Gates's and Obama's thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding." 44 Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, "Obama's willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world's efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race." 45

## Uniq – China not threatened now

### **Recent U.S. space posture reassures China through cooperation instead of competition.**

Baohui **Zhang**, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, **11**

Asian Survey, "The Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationship", March/Aprill 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311.pdf?acceptTC=true>

As Kevin Narizny points out in his study of grand strategy, political turnover in the executive office often leads to dramatic shifts in state behavior. In particular, changes in control of government from one party to another can lead states to redefine their strategic goals and the means of promoting them.<sup>40</sup> The profound and ongoing strategic adjustment by the Obama administration has indeed borne out this argument. The much-maligned grand strategy of primacy and unilateralism has given way to a new stance that emphasizes strategic restraint and multilateral diplomacy. Smart power, rather than military preponderance, is now seen by many as the best way to pursue U.S. interests in the world. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China's traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China's foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat. <sup>41</sup> As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that "the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars."<sup>42</sup> Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely.<sup>43</sup> Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China's view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China's strategic environment. After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon's 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as "a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies." As the analysis emphasizes, "Gates's and Obama's thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding."<sup>44</sup> Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, "Obama's willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world's efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race."<sup>45</sup>

## Uniq – China focusing on commercializing space

### **China modernizing in space: Moon program but it's not violent.**

**Xinhua 6/9/11**

(Deng Shasha, 6/9/11, " China's second moon orbiter Chang'e-2 goes to outer space ",  
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/09/c\\_13920425.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/09/c_13920425.htm))

BEIJING, June 9 (Xinhua) -- China's second moon orbiter Chang'e-2 on Thursday set off from its moon orbit for outer space about 1.5 million km away from the earth, Chinese scientists said Thursday. The orbiter left its moon orbit at 5:10 p.m. and it will take about 85 days for the orbiter to reach outer space, according to the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND). The orbiter had finished all its tasks within its designed life span of six months by April 1. Scientists decided to let it carry out additional exploratory tasks as the orbiter still had fuel in reserve. Traveling into outer space from the moon's orbit is the most important task among five additional ones, according to the SASTIND. "It's the first time in the world for a satellite to be set off from the moon in remote outer space," said Zhou Jianliang, deputy chief engineer of the Chang'e-2 measure and control system of the Beijing Aerospace Control Center (BACC). Moon exploration means about 400,000 km away from the earth, but outer space exploration means 1.5 million km, posing great challenges to the country's technology in measure and control, telecommunications, data transaction and orbit design, scientists said. Before flying away, the orbiter had finished two additional tasks as of May 23. One was to take photos of the northern and southern poles of the moon. The other was to descend again to the perilune orbit, about 15 km away from the surface, to catch high-resolution images of the Sinus Iridum, or Bay of Rainbows, the proposed landing ground for future moon missions. Scientists hope the satellite can continue operations until the end of next year. "We are developing outer space measure and control stations in outer space and they will be capable to carry out tasks by the end of the second half next year," said an SASTIND scientist, who declined to be named. At that time, the satellite can be used to test the two stations' functions, the scientist said. Challenges exist as Chang'e-2 was not designed for the additional task and it is now in extended service without extra capacities to deal with abnormal risks, Zhou said. Meanwhile, long-distance brings many problems like weakening signals and difficulties in measure and control, Zhou said. The Chang'e probes are named after a legendary Chinese moon goddess who flew to the moon. Besides the current operations, China's ambitious three-stage moon mission will include a moon landing and launch of a moon rover around 2012 in the second phase. In the third phase, another rover will land on the moon and return to earth with lunar soil and stone samples for scientific research around 2017. The country has no plan or timetable for a manned moon landing for now. China launched its first lunar probe, Chang'e-1, in October 2007. It became the third country after Russia and the United States to send a person into space in 2003. Two more manned space missions followed with the more recent in 2008 involving the country's first human space walk.

## Link – General

### **Space is about power and prestige – status quo US retreat increases Chinese soft power**

**Kahn, '10** – Jeremy Kahn is an independent journalist based in New Delhi, India, where he covers everything from politics and foreign affairs to business and the arts. (2/1.

<http://thefastertimes.com/india/2010/02/01/new-moon-rising-america-abandons-manned-lunar-missions-india-embraces-them/>)

so it says quite a lot about current geopolitics that just as the United States has decided it will abandon its publicly-funded effort to put men back on the moon, India has announced that it might have a manned lunar mission as early as 2016 (although at the moment, it has only committed itself to putting two Indian astronauts into low Earth orbit that year.) China has already said it plans to have a manned moon shot by 2020. Welcome to the new multipolar world, one where American power is on the wane, while new great powers, such as India and China, are rapidly on the rise. It is also a world characterized by “coopetition” and space is a great example of this. Great powers cooperate on some space efforts (the International Space Station or probes such as Chandrayaan-1, a unmanned moon explorer that was built and launched by India but carried scientific instruments designed by NASA as well as scientists in the UK, Germany, Sweden and Bulgaria) and yet, at the same time, compete fiercely for bragging rights on other space missions (so far the Indian and Chinese manned space flights seem to be wholly national projects.) And maybe more than bragging rights if you look at the increasing militarization of space by the U.S., Russia and China. But as Ben Sandilands at the Australian blog Crickey points out, this new world order may be tough for Americans to come to terms with. Americans once took great pride in their space program, which was seen as a representative of many of the values they believed made their nation great: its ingenuity, its resourcefulness, its ability to think big, to conquer nature (an American value since the first settlers eked out an existence in a forbidding wilderness), and to ever be at the cutting edge of technological progress. Most importantly, it was evidence that America was a country that could achieve monumental, even seemingly impossible, things if it could put its collective mind to the task. Further, it was a nation that believed it was worth spending national treasure to prove such a proposition. As President John F. Kennedy famously said in the 1962 Rice University speech in which he affirmed that America would seek to put a man on the moon by the close of the 1960s (a decision he had actually committed the U.S. to in May 1961):

## Link – General

### **US space influence trades off with Chinese soft power and diplomatic agenda.**

**Pollpeter** Master's degree in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies 2008

( "BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA'S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE," Strategic Studies Institute, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub852.pdf>)

Diplomatic Interests. The importance of China's space diplomacy should not be overstated, but is nevertheless noteworthy. Good relations in space do not drive good relations on Earth. International cooperation on space activities usually follows progress in the overall relationship and is more of an indicator of the state of a relationship than a critical component. It is more likely that China's penchant to offer aid and investment to developing countries without conditions will increase its influence more than cooperation on space activities. Nevertheless, China's space program does play a role in advancing China's diplomatic agenda and China's leadership in this area may contribute to its overall increase in diplomatic influence. China's cooperative space activities present another avenue for countries to participate in space without the United States and increases multipolarity.

The failed attempt by China to become a major player in the Galileo project is just one example of how attempts by China to promote a more multipolar world can impinge on U.S. security interests. China's cooperation with the European Union (EU) and Russia also provide additional opportunities for technology transfer. While China's participation in Galileo has been diminished, future activities may result in closer cooperation between the EU and China. The Sino-Russian cooperation on a Mars exploration mission will certainly result in some form of technical cooperation. Moreover, the likelihood of cooperation with China has prompted some countries to develop space technologies independent of the United States in order to avoid US. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). For example, the Apstar 6 satellite launched by China in April 2005 was Acatel's first ITARfree satellite. Consequently, cooperation with China is making Europe more technologically independent of U.S. industry,

which could increase competition and result in the loss of market share for US. aerospace companies. THE U.S. RESPONSE: CONTAIN, COMPETE,

COOPERATE, OR DO NOTHING? The difficulty in deciding an appropriate response to China's rise as a major space power arises from the inability of both sides to determine whether their relationship will be friendly or hostile. The United States views a more capable China as potentially coming into conflict with its interests. China, for its part, views the US. hedging strategy as possibly thwarting its ambitions to become a major power. The uncertainty of the US-China relationship is reflected in the rise of China's space program, which appears to hold more negative-sum outcomes than positive-sum outcomes for the United States. Indeed, the focus on the negative-sum outcomes of China's space program and possible U.S. responses has increased with the renewed emphasis in both countries on human space flight and lunar exploration. The United States is thus presented with four policy options to meet the changing dynamics presented by China's space program: contain, compete, cooperate, and do nothing. Contain. Containment is the least viable of the four options, and as China becomes more integrated with the world, it will become even less practical. As Avery Goldstein writes, China's grand strategy of integrating itself into international politics and the world economy "undermines the feasibility and desirability of a U.S. policy of containment.

Nations Without the security concerns of the United States will increasingly look upon space as another venue for interacting with China. China has stable and positive working relationships with its neighbors and other major powers, and these relationships, for the most part, are improving. China cooperates with many nations in space and looks to Europe in particular for access to technology and expertise that is denied by the United States. It maintains important cooperative activities with Russia in which Russia sells technology or expertise, especially in regards to China's human spaceflight program. It also maintains important cooperative relationships with organizations based in the EU, including with Surrey Satellite Technology, Ltd. with which China developed two microsatellites. China's heading of the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization also demonstrates just how difficult it would be to isolate China as it takes a leadership role in international space forums. China will benefit from international space cooperation with or without the United States and trying to contain China's space cooperation with other countries, except when US. interests are directly threatened as with the Galileo project, may only undermine its position with other space powers. Compete. The similarities of the two countries human spaceflight programs in terms of technology and lunar programs in terms of timelines has raised the prospect of a new space race in which the two countries compete to send humans to the moon. Accelerating the U.S. return to the moon, however, would require devoting increased resources to

the US. space program at time when the federal budget has come under greater scrutiny. Since the Apollo program the American public has been unwilling to fund the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) much beyond a 1 percent share of the federal budget and at a time of deepening budget deficits and ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it appears unlikely that NASA can garner the support needed for greater budgets. Indeed, in February 2007 the U.S. Congress passed a continuing resolution which froze NASA's budget at the level for 2005-06, which was a \$545 million reduction in the amount requested by the Bush administration. The action resulted in \$677 million less for the human space flight

program due to funding required for the construction of the International Space Station and will delay development of the new Crew Exploration Vehicle until 2015. Support for another space race faces an additional hurdle. The American public is not as emotionally invested in its space program as during the 1950s and 1960s. The historical conditions that created the space race were unique and pitted rival superpowers in a contest of economic systems and global support. While many Americans recognize China as a potential threat, most do not regard it as inimical to US. interests as the Soviet Union. U.S.-China relations may be ambivalent, but they are also ones in which extensive cooperation takes place, and it is not apparent how defining China as a competitor in a space race will further relations.

It is also not apparent whether the American public will support a race which it has already won. The United States first landed men on the moon in 1969 and may be in no rush to return. Cooperate. Alternatively, the similarities of the two space programs have prompted calls for cooperation. Supporters of cooperation argue that cooperation in space has the potential to increase transparency and trust and to lessen competitive aspects that may lead to armed conflict. Supporters of cooperation also argue that cooperation can produce dependencies on the United States for technologies that could be used as leverage to influence the Chinese space program in ways advantageous to the United States and can increase the transparency of the Chinese space program. A policy that treats China as a friend, however, has its own shortcomings. Because China's strategy is designed to further its own national interests and because its interests are often not aligned with US interests, it is unlikely that assisting China in increasing its space power will eliminate these differences and may, in fact, exacerbate them.

Moreover, cooperation in space is of limited value in advancing U.S.-China ties considering the secondary role of space diplomacy, and cooperation in space will not help resolve differences over Taiwan, human rights, or Chinese economic practices.

## Link – Leadership

### **US space leadership threatens Chinese sovereignty and softpower.**

Eric **Hagt** Eric Hagt is the director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, in Washington, D.C. and Beijing. His research interests include Sino-U.S. relations in the field of space, energy and a range of non-traditional security issues. **2007** China Security, pp. 31 – 51 ©2007 World Security Institute, “China’s ASAT Test: Strategic Response” Winter 2007 Herm

In the past decade, China has derived a number of key conclusions from its observations of U.S. military activities in space that have fundamentally shaped China’s own strategic posture. The first is the profound implications of space for information and high-tech wars. China witnessed with awe and alarm the power of the U.S. military using satellite communication, reconnaissance, geo-positioning and integration capabilities for an impressive show of force beginning first with the Gulf war in 1991 to the recent campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. military’s almost complete dependence on space assets has also not escaped the close examination of Chinese analysts.<sup>2</sup> Coupled with a number of key U.S. policy and military documents that call for control in space and the development of space weapons as well as the U.S. refusal to enter into any restrictive space arms control treaty, China has concluded that America is determined to dominate and control space.<sup>3</sup> This perceived U.S. intent leads Beijing to assume the inevitable weaponization of space.<sup>4</sup> Even more worrisome for China is the direct impact of these developments on China’s core national interests. The accelerated development of the U.S. ballistic missile system, especially as it is being developed in close cooperation with Japan, has been cited as threatening China’s homeland and nuclear deterrent.<sup>5</sup> The ‘Shriever’ space war games conducted by the U.S. Air Force in 2001, 2003 and 2005<sup>6</sup> strongly reinforced the conclusion that U.S. space control sets China as a target.<sup>7</sup> Most central to China’s concerns, however, is the direct affect U.S. space dominance will have on China’s ability to prevail in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits.<sup>8</sup> As U.S. military space developments have evolved, China’s observations and subsequent conclusions have engendered a fundamental response: we cannot accept this state of affairs. For reasons of defense of national sovereignty as well as China’s broader interests in space – civilian, commercial and military – America’s pursuit of space control and dominance and its pursuit to develop ASATs and space weapons pose an intolerable risk to China’s national security.<sup>9</sup> China’s own ASAT test embodied this message. Attempting to redress what China perceives as a critically imbalanced strategic environment that increasingly endangers its interests, China demonstrated a deterrent to defend against that threat. Its willingness to risk international opprobrium through such a test conveys China’s grim resolve to send that message.

### **U.S. space leadership causes Chinese space militarization.**

Baohui **Zhang**, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, **11**

Asian Survey, "The Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationship," November 2, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311.pdf?acceptTC=true>,

In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats. <sup>9</sup> This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for “absolute security” evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.” <sup>10</sup> According to Robert Jervis, “The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.” In this context, “Even if they can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.” <sup>11</sup> Inevitably, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar measures.

## Link – Leadership

### **U.S. space control will cause China arms race.**

**Podvig and Zhang**, Zhang: Postdoctorial Fellow from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. Podvig: research associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, 2008- (American Academy of Arts and Sciences, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” 2008, <https://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.aspx>)

CHINA'S MAJOR SECURITY CONCERNS U.S. missile defense and space weaponization plans could affect China's national interests, security environment, and commercial and civilian space activities. What are the various Chinese perspectives on U.S. plans and proposals? How does the U.S. pursuit of space dominance affect China's security? What is China's view on the effect of U.S. plans on the prospects for arms control, the nonproliferation regime, and the protection of the environment of space? What China Perceives The United States is pursuing a “Space Control” strategy. Many Chinese officials and security experts have read with great interest the U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years. 3 These documents explicitly envision U.S. control of space and the achievement of global military superiority through the use of weapons in or from space. The United States has issued a series of official statements in recent years that discuss the vulnerability of U.S. space assets to attack without warning and the need to protect U.S. satellites from all possible threats. The statements propose that the U.S. respond with the forceful domination of space and denial of access to those who may intend harm. 4 Space control would assure U.S. access to and freedom of operations in space, and would deny others' use of space. This mission includes: space surveillance, protection of U.S. space systems, prevention or negation of an adversary's ability to use space systems and services for purposes hostile to U.S. national security interests, and direct support for battle management, command, control, communications, and intelligence. 5 The negation mission would include “measures to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy an adversary's space capabilities.” 6 A number of high-level official documents show the intention of the United States to develop, deploy, and use space weapons. In 2001, the report of a special commission on U.S. national security in space, chaired by current Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, warned of the need “to avoid a ‘space Pearl Harbor.’” The commissioners recommended “the U.S. government... vigorously pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the president will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to, and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.” 7 In its 2003 report, Transformation Flight Plan, the U.S. Air Force lists a number of space weapon systems desirable in the event of a space war. 8 These include space-based kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers (SBL), hypervelocity rod bundles, space-based radio-frequency energy weapons, space maneuver vehicles, and evolutionary air-and-space global laser engagement. In August 2004, the Air Force released the doctrine document Counterspace Operations, which defines space superiority as the “freedom to attack as well as the freedom from attack” in space. 9 Counterspace operations include of- Although there has been no formal public change in U.S. space policy, many Chinese are convinced by official statements and visible activity that U.S. policy is driving toward space weaponization—the development of weapons able to destroy targets in or from space. These weapons would presumably provide the United States with control over access to space and activity in space. Professor Du Xiangwan, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, said that the 2003 Transformation Flight Plan indicated that “many types of space based weapons will be developed” and that “the tendency of space weaponization is obvious and serious.” He further pointed out that achieving military supremacy on Earth is not enough, as “the U.S. also seeks to dominate space.” 11 Ambassador Li Daoyu, President of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, recently stated, “As we cheer for every success of peaceful exploration and use of outer space, we also hear the approaching bugling of war. The space military technology is advancing rapidly. New military and combat concepts and theories like ‘control of space’ and ‘occupation of space’ are emerging. Research and development programs of space weapons are in implementation. The danger of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is ever more imminent.”

### **China pursuing space multipolarity.**

Michael **Sheehan**, Professor of International Relations at the University of Wales, Swansea, 07 Rutledge, "The International Politics of Space", 2007, [http://bib.tiera.ru/dvd64/Sheehan%20M.%20-%20The%20International%20Politics%20of%20Space\(2007\)\(248\).pdf](http://bib.tiera.ru/dvd64/Sheehan%20M.%20-%20The%20International%20Politics%20of%20Space(2007)(248).pdf), [Zheng]

China also continues to pursue the possibility of participation in the International Space Station. Having indigenously developed its own manned space programme China is in a stronger comparative bargaining position than it previously was. In addition, since Chinese manned space systems are based on Russian designs they ‘can easily be made compatible and interoperable with the ISS, which relies on many Russian components’. 45 However, it has made it clear that if this does not materialise, then it will go ahead and develop a second international space station in partnership with other countries, in order to encourage the development of multipolarity in space. This would allow other states to use space in a way which reduces the American dominance in a way that no state could hope to do purely through its own efforts. It would also allow other states, particularly those from the developing world, to play a genuine role in shaping future international space developments from the outset, rather than simply participating in an environment shaped by others. 46

## Link – Commercial Developments

### **Presence of dual-use tech and Chinese nationalism ensure any additional US development of space leads to retaliation**

Michael **Caldararo**, graduate student at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) studying Public Administration, **08**

Global Innovation and Strategy Center, "The Impact of Chinese Culture," December 2008, PDF

Strong Chinese nationalism also plays directly into Chinese leaders' frequent feelings of insecurity. Chinese leaders often worry whether global powers such as the U.S. will seek to remove the CCP. Accordingly, China's political and military leaders are constantly on the lookout for threats and conspiracies<sup>168</sup> and often follow more conservative foreign policies, which will secure the CCP's political legitimacy.<sup>169</sup> The Chinese sense of insecurity and fear might also be attributed to the power of the U.S. and its national space policy, which is often described as a "doctrine of space dominance."<sup>170</sup> With the current international political climate, countries like China look to U.S. actions in the Middle East and wonder whether the U.S. space policy follows the tenants of preemptive strikes. Countries aiming to become independent powers in space technology might spend time and 166 effort making sure that they could withstand an aggressive U.S. space policy.<sup>171</sup> Furthermore, countries fearful of space globalization might also see an aggressive space policy as an attempt to negate the deterrence of nuclear weapons. This could prompt countries with nuclear capabilities to build up their space programs to remain a worldwide power.<sup>172</sup> However, it has been said that China is noticeably relieved that the U.S. remains focused on the Middle East instead of containing China's rise to power.<sup>173</sup> Such views of the potential U.S. threat exacerbate already present fears, which serve to create a circular argument reminiscent of the violence escalation cycle discussed in psychological research. Any event could start the violence escalation sequence (e.g., the Chinese ASAT test in January 2007 and the Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade), which would then cause the U.S. to perceive China as a threat to international space cooperation, while at the same time China would see the U.S. as a similar threat and seek to challenge its hegemony. Both sides have merit to their arguments, as access to space and dualuse technologies for both civilian and military organizations understandably cause insecurity. Accordingly, China's label of the U.S. as a hegemon that seeks to threaten or contain China could be seen as an appropriate response to U.S. policies and Congressional acts seeking to isolate China and prevent it from obtaining space technologies. While some progress has been made following the Cold War, many Chinese analysts remain highly critical of U.S. policies and see the U.S. as actively seeking to manipulate China and subvert its return to power.<sup>174</sup> In turn, the Chinese government's response often fuels the U.S. perception that China must be isolated and prevented from acquiring space technology. Constant suspicion likely results in continued mistrust between states, allowing the escalation cycle to continue. For international progress to be made, the escalation cycle must be broken before a space arms race emerges. This break can also emerge through reciprocal understanding of different cultures. China can learn much from the economic and diplomatic actions of global powers and the U.S. can strive to better comprehend Chinese culture and interpersonal relations.

### **China perceives commercial programs as zero sum**

**Brown**, MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological U. Singapore; **9**  
[Trevor Brown, published in Air and Space Power Journal; "Soft Power and Space Weaponization"; Spring 2009; <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html>;

The United States would do well to keep a low profile for its military space program and burnish its technological image by showcasing its commercial and scientific space programs. Doing so would enable it to accumulate rather than hemorrhage soft power. Such a rationale is not lost on the Chinese, who certainly have had their successes in recent years in building soft power and using it to extend their influence around the globe. According to National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) administrator Michael Griffin, the Chinese have a carefully thought-out human-spaceflight program that will take them up to parity with the United States and Russia. They're investing to make China a strategic world power second to none in order to reap the deals and advantages that flow to world leaders.<sup>30</sup> Analysts believe that the United States' determination to maintain dominance in military space has caused it to lose ground in commercial space and space exploration. They maintain that the United States is giving up its civilian space leadership—an action that will have huge strategic implications.<sup>31</sup> Although the US public may be indifferent to space commerce or scientific activities, technological feats in space remain something of a marvel to the broader world. In 1969 the world was captivated by man's first walk on the moon. The Apollo program paid huge dividends in soft power at a time when the United States found itself dueling with the Soviets to attract other nations into its ideological camp. Unless the United States has a strong presence on the moon at the time of China's manned lunar landing, scheduled for 2017, much of the world will have the impression that China has approached the United States in terms of technological sophistication and comprehensive national power.<sup>32</sup> If recent trends hold, this is likely to come at a time when the new and emerging ideological confrontation between Beijing and Washington will have intensified considerably.<sup>33</sup>

## IL – Zero Sum

### **China's soft power initiatives are viewed as zero-sum**

**Kalathil**, Senior Fellow at USAID- Associate at Carnegie Endowment - Consultant and World Bank, 2011- (GEORGETOWN Institute for the study of diplomacy, "China's Soft Power in the Information Age: Think Again," may 2011. [http://isd.georgetown.edu/files/Kalathil\\_Chinas\\_Soft\\_Power.pdf](http://isd.georgetown.edu/files/Kalathil_Chinas_Soft_Power.pdf) [JUNEJA])

For the last few years, China's rise has been examined—both uneasily and admiringly—by those who are interested in the country's power to influence and attract. Chinese officials themselves have mentioned soft power as one of the strategic elements behind China's rise, and many of the country's foreign policies are carried out in order to boost soft power capabilities. Some argue that China's soft power strategy has seemed largely reactive and fairly narrowly targeted to bolster economic resources, shore up strategic regional positioning, and/or counter perceived misperceptions about China. Moreover, some China watchers believe that, rather than being deployed specifically to counter U.S. prestige and influence, China's soft power initiatives are undertaken mainly to strengthen national interests. <sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, many international observers tend to see China's upping of its soft power capabilities as a zero-sum game with western powers and with the United States in particular. One analyst believes China's doctrines of "win-win" and respect for state sovereignty intentionally form an implicit contrast with the perceived arrogance and interventionism of the United States; meanwhile, China's soft power strategies include focusing on countries whose bilateral relationships with the United States are shaky. <sup>4</sup> Because of this, China's soft power capabilities have been the subject of much attention in recent years, in both the popular press and academia. In the eyes of many, China's growing soft power prowess is a formidable given. There is some differentiation between China's soft power aims in the United States, Europe and in developing countries. In regions such as Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, where China has been particularly active, soft power initiatives tend to be tied to key resources, such as energy resources. Soft power initiatives are also aimed at persuading countries to renounce official diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and hew to China's "one China" policy. In the West broadly, China's soft power efforts tend toward subtler and less specifically targeted efforts, such as producing international culture and history exhibits and participating in international events (such as the Olympics) while directly engaging foreign publics through language institutes and media. In these latter initiatives, the goal is generally to shift the narrative on China, countering negative perceptions and burnishing China's image to the rest of the world.

### **Soft power is zero sum**

**Yoshihara and Holmes**, '7 – Toshi Yoshihara is a Research Fellow and the resident expert on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. James R. Holmes is a defence analyst for The Diplomat and an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College where he specializes in US, Chinese and Indian maritime strategy and US diplomatic and military history. (Orbis, Volume 52, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 123-137. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438707001196>)

First, is soft power a zero-sum game? In other words, do Chinese gains necessarily portend a loss for the United States? Judging by their words, many Chinese leaders do see soft power as direct competition, describing it in great-power terms. For example, former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing has spoken of "soft-power competition" among the "big powers." <sup>36</sup> To date U.S. leaders have viewed Beijing's soft-power diplomacy with equanimity, as a harmless effort to resuscitate the nation's history and traditions. If indeed China intends to use soft power to erode America's position as steward of regional maritime security, then it behooves Washington to start taking Beijing's Zheng He narrative (and other manifestations of soft-power diplomacy) seriously. And, as Joseph Nye counsels, wise statesmen incorporate efforts to enhance their nation's power of attraction into foreign policy as a matter of course—regardless of whether this is a zero-sum game.<sup>37</sup>

### **Any space development is zero sum**

**Johnson-Freese**, '4 – Joan Johnson-Freese is Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the United States Naval War College (<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinese-chess-space>)

To be sure, there would be resistance to working with China. Washington is replete with individuals adamantly objecting to cooperation with China on grounds from human rights to its status as the largest remaining communist country. Isolating China, however, is increasingly a stance counterproductive to US interests, as a world without China is simply not possible. US and Chinese interests frequently overlap, on North Korea and the Global War on Terror, for example, not to mention economics. The United States has a window of opportunity to step in and use space cooperation to its advantage. Because space is considered so critical to the futures of both the US and China, any activity by one has been considered zero-sum by the other, triggering an action-reaction cycle and threatening escalation into an arms race of technology and countermeasure development. That direction can be changed. A inclusive vision will give the US an opportunity to assume the mantle of leadership on a mission that could inspire the world and shift Chinese activities into areas more compatible with US interests. On the geostrategic Wei Qi board, cooperation is the best "next move" for the US.



## IL – space is key

### **Space is key – it's the main area of US-Sino competition**

James G. **Jinnett 2009** Lieutenant Colonel United States Airforce “US CHINA POLICY: TIME FOR ROBUST ENGAGEMENT” USAWC Strategy Research Project <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497538&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>>

Space is another critical shared arena of potential interest-based engagement which must be addressed immediately because of its perceived strategic importance to both China and the US. As America sees its preeminence in space erode with ever increasing Chinese efforts to dominate space in its own way, China recognizes that space offers it an asymmetric advantage which may help it counter the US during any eventual conflict. Because China depends on access to resources from sea lanes, its primary geopolitical dilemma is maritime power. Quite simply, China views the US Navy as its primary threat. But China well knows how much America's Navy utilizes space assets to perform its mission, and sees unique opportunities in space to counter the threat to its economic stability. As George Friedman observes, “from the Chinese point of view, the denial of space to the United States would undermine American denial of the seas to China.” For this reason, China has accelerated its efforts in space; it has destroyed a satellite, conducted a manned spacewalk, and has plans to send an unmanned rover to the surface of the Moon with manned mission to follow years later. Reacting to these developments, experts within the Obama team have considered removing some barriers which exist between NASA and the US Military's space program to find economies and accelerate NASA's manned space flight timetable. On both sides of the Pacific, space is viewed as a key strategic arena, and both China and the US are taking aggressive steps to gain and or maintain dominance of space to protect their individual national interests.

## Chinese Soft Power Good

### **Chinese power and influence prevents global economic collapse and nuclear conflict**

**Buzan and Foot** – Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science AND Professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College – **2004** (Barry and Rosemary, Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal, ed. by B. Buzan and R. Foot, Questia, p.

145-147)

China, East Asia and the world

The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The US clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the US is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation.

Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the US. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the US, and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the US uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the US and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the US deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with US support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed.

The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce US-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the US and the other great powers.

China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development

Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables:

- Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)?
- Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)?

If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constraint.



## Soft Power stops Taiwan Independence

### **China soft power key to reunification with Taiwan**

Hongying **Wang**, associate professor of political science at Syracuse University, **and** Yeh-Chung **Lu**, PhD candidate at George Washington University, **08**

Journal of Contemporary China, "The Conception of Soft power and its Policy Implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan", August 2008,

[http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/429445\\_731200556\\_794248953.pdf](http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/429445_731200556_794248953.pdf),

Second, what is the nature of international competition in today's world? Nye's framework suggests that with the obsolescence of major wars in the post-imperial era, competition in soft power has become more and more important in international relations. Chinese analysts seem to find this persuasive. They argue that since the end of the Cold War, this trend has become even more salient. Nations increasingly compete with one another on beliefs, institutions, cultural attraction, and human resources.<sup>61</sup> For example, the US has actively tried to influence others by bringing the American way of life to other parts of the world. The West, in general, has sought to use engagement to lead China down the road of 'peaceful evolution'.<sup>62</sup> To counter this attack, China must launch its own offensives, using its own sources of soft power.<sup>63</sup> Some commentators see China and Taiwan as engaged in a soft power competition. They argue that the peaceful unification with Taiwan requires the Chinese government to develop and use soft power to win over the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan.<sup>64</sup>

### **China using its soft power to bar Taiwan from gaining foreign support for independence** **CRS 06**

Congressional Research Service, "The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: US Policy Choices", 13 January 2006, [http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA462705&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

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At the diplomatic and political level, cross-strait relations have been cold (frigid). Beijing is using its rising economic and political clout as leverage in furthering its diplomatic agenda. China has held the upper hand in barring Taiwan from membership in most major international organizations (Taiwan's accession to the World Trade Organization was as a separate customs territory) and from receiving diplomatic recognition from the major countries of the world. The PRC has been particularly aggressive and uncompromising, even going so far as blocking Taiwan from receiving unofficial observer status in the World Health Organization and preventing the president of Taiwan from attending the annual meetings of the leaders of the 21 member states at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. China's diplomats also are taking the lead in regional meetings, and China's economic clout is inducing countries that previously recognized Taiwan to shift their diplomacy toward Beijing.<sup>28</sup> Taiwan, on the other hand, has also been pressing for more room to maneuver on both the diplomatic and political levels. President Chen Shui-ban has emphasized that Taiwan is a sovereign state and should not be downgraded, marginalized, or treated as a local government.<sup>29</sup>

### **China's soft power prevent any foreign support necessary for Taiwan independence**

Joshua **Kurlantzick**, Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, **07**

Yale University, "Charm offensive: how China's soft power is transforming the world", 2007,

[http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fu8FZegPSXcC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=china+soft+power&ots=1HpHj\\_IvmE&sig=0Bgl-pKR-EKVG0KgGGDNMTQYd2Y#v=onepage&q&f=false](http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fu8FZegPSXcC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=china+soft+power&ots=1HpHj_IvmE&sig=0Bgl-pKR-EKVG0KgGGDNMTQYd2Y#v=onepage&q&f=false),

Beijing also flexes its muscles to isolate Taiwan. Countries are dropping Taiwan partly because they desire closer relations with Beijing and partly because they fear offending China. Either way, for many nations cutting ties to Taiwan now makes sense - it hurts very little but pleases China enormously. In Latin America, where Taiwan retains nearly half of its formal allies in the world, China's economic success, aid, and broader popularity have in recent years swayed Dominica and Grenada to switch recognition to Beijing, while Guatemala has opened commercial relations with China, often the first step toward recognition. Latin American nations have prevented Taiwan from obtaining observer status at the Organization of American States, the region's most important international grouping. Matters could get worse for Taipei. If Panama switched recognition to Beijing, other Central American nations probably would follow, since Panama is the most important nation in Central America still recognizing Taiwan. In 2004, during Panama's presidential election, one leading candidate announced that if elected he would open ties to Beijing. Though he lost, his position cannot have reassured Taipei, and several prominent Latin America scholars believe that within a decade Taiwan will retain no formal allies in Central or South America." □

## **Soft Power stops Taiwan independence**

### **China soft power key to win Taiwanese "hearts and minds" - prevents them from seceding CRS 06**

Congressional Research Service, "The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: US Policy Choices", 13 January 2006, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA462705&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

In no area is the mix of economics and security more intertwined than across the Taiwan Strait. China's strategy has been to maintain a truculent position against Taiwan independence with credible threats of military action against what Beijing considers to be a "renegade province" should Taiwan attempt to make its de facto quasi-independent status into one more de jure. China has backed up its rhetoric by deploying an estimated 600 missiles that can be aimed at Taiwan along the south China coast and augmenting its ability to launch naval attacks. On the other hand, the PRC has encouraged Taiwan businesses to invest in the PRC in the hope that the increasing economic and financial interdependence would ameliorate the political forces for independence. In a white paper, Beijing said that with respect to Taiwan, "doors have been flung open to facilitate the flow of goods and people. Businessmen from Taiwan are welcome to invest or trade on the mainland. They are accorded preferential treatment and legal safeguards."<sup>17</sup> By creating a dependency by Taiwan's businesses on Chinese workers, subsidiaries, sources of supply, and markets, China has sought to win the "hearts and minds" of Taiwanese business interests. In the process, however, China also has created its own dependency on Taiwanese businesses — particularly in information technology industries — for advanced technology, manufacturing methods, and export channels.

## Taiwan War Impacts

### **China-Taiwan war draws in the U.S.**

**Lieberthal**, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development, **05**

(84 Foreign Affairs 53, "Preventing a War over Taiwan." 2005.

[http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora84&div=31&g\\_sent=1&collection=journals](http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora84&div=31&g_sent=1&collection=journals).

one of the greatest dangers to international security today is the possibility of a military confrontation between China and Taiwan that leads to a war between China and the United States. Such a war would be not only tragic but also unnecessary, since it would result from a failure of imagination and diplomacy—fought because a place that has long declared itself independent was attacked for doing so again. Neither Beijing nor Taipei wants war, but both sides have adopted policies that run an unacceptably high risk of bloodshed over the next several years. The Bush administration should therefore take steps now to reduce the prospect of conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Understanding what those steps should be, however, requires getting past the rhetorical constructs that have dominated discussion to date. China says that it wants stability across the Taiwan Strait, that it can postpone final resolution of the cross-strait issue for a long time, that it is developing its regional military capabilities solely to deter Taiwanese independence, and that it will use force if necessary to prevent or reverse a declaration of independence. But these positions have not served China's interests well, because it has failed to make clear exactly what "declaring independence" involves. By not doing so, Beijing has risked miscalculation by a Taiwanese leadership that does not want to provoke a military response but continues to push the envelope just short of one. The fact that for more than a decade Taiwan's leaders have declared Taiwan to be "an independent, sovereign country" without dramatic consequences adds to the confusion. Beijing's stance now runs the risk that Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian will consider China's threats a bluff (Chen's pro-independence predecessor Lee Teng-hui, for example, has said that Beijing is nothing more than a "paper tiger.") Ironically, Beijing's position also enhances the stature and leverage of the pro-independence elements in Taiwan. Since China says war and peace will be determined by what these individuals say and do, they attract enormous domestic and international attention. China may be able to continue on its current course, expanding trade and investment ties with Taiwan while insisting that the island's leaders accept the "one-China principle" as a precondition for any political talks and threatening the use of force in response to a declaration of independence. But if it does, it will be tying both its credibility and the chances of a confrontation to forces beyond its control.

### **US-Sino conflict will escalate & first strike – space & counter-measures insure quick action**

**TELLIS 08** senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

[Ashley J. Tellis, China's Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests, Ashley J. Tellis, October 08,

<http://www.carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=22595>]

Fourth, China's evolving space and counterspace capabilities promise to expand the dimensions of the battlespace – virtually and physically – in the context of any future Sino-American conflict. Because space-supported conventional operations will become critical for victory for both sides; because the space component of military actions – that is, the space, ground, and link segments in their totality – is conspicuous, highly valuable, vulnerable, and contains relatively few nodes; because defensive and offensive counterspace operations may be hard to distinguish especially in the early phases of a conflict; because both sides will seek to competitively use space to expand their situational awareness while denying the same advantage to the adversary; and, because Chinese operational planning, given its overall conventional weakness, calls for counterspace operations as an integrated element of its military response, it is likely that a future Sino-American conflict, even if intended to be limited in a political sense, will be unable to either bound its offensive operations to the local battlefield alone or resist the temptation to launch crippling attacks first. The demands of victory, even in limited wars, will thus require that the force applied – in both material and virtual senses – range far beyond the physical battlefield to the "rear": in the adversary's homeland, possibly in territories of third-parties, and certainly in the realms of space, electronic combat, and computer network operations. Moreover, **it may create strong incentives for "first strikes" because of the perceived benefits to conventional operations arising from being able to blind an adversary decisively,** even if only for a short time. In such circumstances, ensuring that a future limited war between China and the United States stays restricted will itself become a significant challenge.

## Non-Unique – China Militarizing Now

**Displays of peace are a public facade, China is dedicated to space weaponization - Pentagon reports prove** Michael E. O'Hanlon, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, 11 National Defense University, "Balancing US Security Interests in Space", <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/space-Ch21.pdf>, ]

China is certainly taking steps to improve its capabilities in space operations. According to a Pentagon assessment, "Exploitation of space and acquisition of related technologies remain high priorities in Beijing. China is placing major emphasis on improving spacebased reconnaissance and surveillance. . . . China is cooperating with a number of countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, in order to advance its objectives in space." China will also surely focus on trying to neutralize U.S. space assets in any future such conflict; no prudent military planner could do anything else, and the early 2007 ASAT test would seem to confirm this logic. According to the Pentagon, in language written before that 2007 test: Publicly, China opposes the militarization of space, and seeks to prevent or slow the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems and space-based ballistic missile defenses. Privately, however, China's leaders probably view ASATs—and offensive counterspace systems, in general—as well as space-based missile defenses as inevitabilities. . . . Given China's current level of interest in laser technology, Beijing probably could develop a weapon that could destroy satellites in the future.<sup>12</sup> Exactly how many U.S. satellites, and of what type, China might be able to damage or destroy is hard to predict. But it seems likely that low-altitude satellites as well as higher altitude commercial communications satellites would be vulnerable. Low-altitude imaging satellites are vulnerable to direct attack by nuclear-armed missiles, at a minimum, by high-energy lasers on the ground, and quite possibly by rapidly orbited or predeployed microsats as well. They are sufficiently hardened that they would have to be attacked one by one to ensure their rapid elimination. And they are sufficiently capable of transmitting signals through or around jamming that China probably could not stop their effective operation in that way. But they are few enough in number, and sufficiently valuable, that China might well find the means to go after each one.

**China is continuing to deploy and develop space weapons to deny the US access.**

**Asia Times 08**, "China take on the US in Space", June 6, 2008,

<http://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:DO4IE->

[uoJE8J:www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JF06Ado1.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JF06Ado1.html)+space+weapon+inevitable&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=25&gl=us //E.Berggren, ]

"Even as it tries to rally multinational coalitions and public opinion to oppose 'the weaponization of space', Beijing quietly continues to develop its own space-based weapons and tactics to destroy American military assets." Heritage Foundation vice president for foreign policy and defense studies, Larry M Wortzel, railed in a commentary. "China's strategy here is to blunt American military superiority by limiting and ultimately neutralizing its existing space-based defense assets, and to forestall deployment of new technology that many experts believe would provide the best protection from ballistic missile attack." Last month, Chinese President Hu Jintao sided with Russia in its long-running campaign to block the deployment of a US missile defense system covering much of East Asia that would partly operate from bases in Eastern Europe. Some analysts believe Beijing is worried the deployment of American space-based interceptors would block missiles the PLA has been upgrading to target what it calls the renegade island of Taiwan and US Pacific bases. Certainly, the Chinese military apparatus hasn't been sitting on its haunches while its diplomats have been getting all worked up over the Americans. Security analysts say it has poured cash into an electronic warfare capability designed to jam satellite transmissions, developed laser-based weapons and improved its heavy-lift rockets.

## Non-Unique - China thinks we're aggressive now

### **Chinese suspicion of US space activity now - threatened by past US unilateralism in space**

Hui **Zhang**, Research Associate in the International Affairs at Harvard University's  
John F. Kennedy School of Government, **08**

American Academy of Arts and Sciences, "Chinese Perspectives on Space Weapons", 2008, PDF]

Although there has been no formal public change in U.S. space policy, many Chinese are convinced by official statements and visible activity that U.S. policy is driving toward space weaponization—the development of weapons able to destroy targets in or from space. These weapons would presumably provide the United States with control over access to space and activity in space. Professor Du Xiangwan, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, said that the 2003 Transformation Flight Plan indicated that “many types of space based weapons will be developed” and that “the tendency of space weaponization is obvious and serious.” He further pointed out that achieving military supremacy on Earth is not enough, as “the U.S. also seeks to dominate space.”<sup>11</sup> Ambassador Li Daoyu, President of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, recently stated, “As we cheer for every success of peaceful exploration and use of outer space, we also hear the approaching bugling of war. The space military technology is advancing rapidly. New military and combat concepts and theories like ‘control of space’ and ‘occupation of space’ are emerging. Research and development programs of space weapons are in implementation. The danger of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is ever more imminent.”<sup>12</sup> In addition to the U.S. space control theory and doctrine, other U.S. actions suggest to China that the move toward space weaponization is real. For example, as discussed in detail below, the United States is developing and deploying missile defense systems, and has a number of active space weapons programs.

Moreover, the U.S. has withdrawn from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Though not a party to the treaty, China viewed it as a cornerstone of strategic stability and an important legal instrument for preventing the deployment of weapons in space. Since withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the United States has had free reign to accelerate its space weaponization plans if it so chooses.

### **China perceives US space policy as unilateral and aggressive.**

Kevin **Pollpeter**, China Program Manager at Defense Group Inc.'s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, **08**

Army War College, "Building for the Future: China's Progress in Space Technology During the Tenth 5-year Plan and the US Response", March 08,

<http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gXoahvJYxwAC&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&dq=us+china+space+policy+peaceful&ots=vNj5ty01Xy&sig=A5hbTWLZ61cDqLhcyE7PGi7pyVo#v=onepage&q=multilateral&f=false>]

Since the mid-1990's, the United States has had little cooperation with China in space. Convictions of US aerospace companies for illegally transferring technology to China put a halt to most cooperation between the two countries. In addition, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin traveled to China in September 2006 to explore the possibilities of cooperative activities, but little came of the trip. Inaction is a safe option that does not risk the transfer of technology or expertise. A policy of inaction does risk ignoring the possible benefits of cooperation, however. As Clay Moltz writes, “It is self-defeating for the United States to be trapped into sending signal about the impossibility of space cooperation to emerging powers, such as China, where threat reduction should instead be a high U.S. security priority.” Refusal to participate in multilateral space activities involving China, for example, will unnecessarily put the United States at a disadvantage since it will have little leverage to address its concerns.

## Non-Unique – Chinese Soft Power low

### **Human rights violations hurt Chinese softpower**

**Nye**, “Joseph S. Nye, Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, and former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government has been on the faculty at Harvard since 1964. He has also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology”, 6

[Discussion: Professor Joseph S. Nye Jr. Professor Erza Vogel Professor Xue Lan Professor Anthony Saich, Moderator: Harvard discussion of soft power; “The Rise of China’s Soft Power”; 4/19/2006;

[http://www.iop.harvard.edu/JFKJrForumArchive/transcripts/04192006\\_The\\_Rise\\_of\\_Chinas\\_Soft\\_Power.pdf](http://www.iop.harvard.edu/JFKJrForumArchive/transcripts/04192006_The_Rise_of_Chinas_Soft_Power.pdf)]

Let me turn to the question of soft power. What is it? Well, power is the ability to get others to do what you want, and you can do that three ways: you can threaten people with coercion that sticks, you can pay them with carrots or inducements, or you can attract them so that they want the same things you want. And that third way, attracting people is soft power. And it grows out of a country’s culture, values, and policies. If we think in those sense, in those terms, you ask about Chinese soft power. Look at Chinese culture. Chinese popular culture is becoming more attractive than it used to be. It still doesn’t have anything like Hollywood or India’s Bollywood, but it is a different popular culture today. And I’m not even mentioning of course traditional Chinese culture, which has always been very attractive to other parts of the world. In addition to that you find that China has tripled the proportion of international students at Chinese universities. You suddenly found countries— other countries in Asia but around the world, wanting to go to China. Same thing with Chinese tourism. And if you look at Chinese government efforts to promote Chinese culture: the establishment of Confucius institutions, the increased broadcasting by China Radio International, which now does much more than the Voice of America does in East Asia. These are some examples of China’s investment in soft power. The other thing that’s interesting though is if you’re a country like China, which is growing so dramatically in your military and economic power, you do create a sense of anxiety among your neighbors. **Others get worried. So it’s very much in China’s interest to stress what they call “peaceful rise,” or essentially to emphasize Chinese diplomacy as having soft power.** If you compare China’s attitudes today towards Southeast Asia or the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea questions, it’s a very much softer diplomacy than it was a decade ago. And I think that’s learning on China’s part that the way you formulate your policies can make you more and less attractive. And I think they’ve been doing quite well in that dimension. And then if you look at the question of China as a role model, that’s an interesting thing. Some people say that you know, the economic role model for the world in the 90s was the so-called Washington consensus of liberal democratic capitalism. Others have argued well no, that’s been replaced by the Beijing consensus, which is authoritarian rapid growth. But that’s where I think Chinese soft power begins to fall apart or run into trouble, in the following sense: It’s one thing to say that the Beijing consensus of authoritarian rapid growth is attractive to Zimbabwe or to the members of the Shanghai consultative organization in Central Asia, but when it comes to Europe or North America, that’s where China starts to lose the soft power. Human rights violations, absence of democracy—these are hurting China in its efforts to build its soft power. So ironically when you get to this issue of economic policies, while they attract some, they repel others. You can say, “Oh, but does it matter?” Well, think back to the last year when China was trying to get Europe to relax the embargo on armed shipments to China. And the fact that China had a rather hard powered view if you think in those terms and its model of economic growth helped it to undercut that policy that China wanted. It’s interesting— Just to finish up by looking at some recent polls that were taken by the BBC in January. Is China’s soft power increasing? Yes. In fact, compared to the United States, Chinese influence was rated positively in twenty out of thirtythree countries polled, whereas the United States only was rated positively in thirteen out of the thirty-three countries polled. And China’s ratings are impressive. But when you get to the question as posed about China’s growing economic power, there’s quite a positive response. But when you get to the question about China’s military power, then there’s—in the words of the poll—“a decidedly cooler reaction” about the prospect of growing China’s military power. And when we asked if people feel is China becoming significantly more powerful militarily than it is today? In seventeen countries more said it would be negative rather than positive. **So China’s soft powers’ a mixed bag. And there are some areas where it’s increasing. Government policy have made efforts often successfully to increase it but there are some areas where other Chinese policies are essentially stepping on their own message.** I think one of the big questions will be whether China finds a way to continue to increase its soft power or whether it runs into a roadblock because of those internal political problems.

## Non-Unique – Chinese Soft Power low

### **Alt causes like its ties to dictators prevent China from projecting their soft power**

Bates **Gill**, expert on Chinese foreign policy and the current director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, **and** Yanzhong **Huang**, Senior Fellow for Global Health and the Council on Foreign Relations, **06**

Survival, "Sources and limits of Chinese 'soft power'", June 2006,

[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a747985000&fulltext=713240928,\]](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a747985000&fulltext=713240928,)

The lack of meaningful political reform, coupled with Beijing's friendship with dictators in the developing world, creates a legitimacy problem. As Nye has pointed out, states most likely to project soft power in an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms, which now emphasise liberalism, pluralism and autonomy.<sup>76</sup> Beijing seems to express few qualms about cutting political and economic deals with corrupt and even brutal dictators. In July 2005, Beijing lavished honours on Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (a disciple of the 'Beijing Consensus'), at a time when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke of Mugabe's 'catastrophic injustice' in implementing his urban eviction programme.<sup>77</sup> Beijing's close economic and political ties with such regimes help keep dictatorships afloat and blunt international pressures for any meaningful economic and political change. In 2004, China also helped deflect US and other Western efforts to take tougher steps against Sudan, which supplies nearly 5% of China's oil but has a notorious human-rights record, especially in its Darfur region.<sup>78</sup> China's close economic and political relations with Iran will also come under greater scrutiny as the international community seeks to stem Tehran's nuclear ambitions. In justifying its activities in Africa, the Chinese government insists 'business is business'.<sup>79</sup> Yet coddling dictators can antagonise democratic oppositions and may bode ill for sustaining Beijing's influence in those countries. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, for example, has made it clear that if it came to power it would not honour any loan repayments or deals signed by Mugabe.<sup>80</sup> To the extent that soft power rests on legitimacy, China must also take growing international commitment to human rights into account or else undermine its international standing at a time it is trying to portray a more benign image. Not coincidentally, the only three countries with a plurality viewing Chinese influence as negative (Germany, the United States and Poland) are liberal democracies.

## Non-Unique – China will be aggressive now

**No peaceful rise – U.S.-China mistrust is structural.**

**Friedberg**, “Aaron L. Friedberg is a professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. His book, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, will be published in August 2011”, **6-21**

[Aaron L. Friedberg, published in *The National Interest*; “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics”; 6/2/2011; <http://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439>]

DEEP-SEATED patterns of power politics are thus driving the United States and China toward mistrust and competition, if not necessarily toward open conflict. But this is not all there is to the story. In contrast to what some realists claim, ideology matters at least as much as power in determining the course of relations among nations. The fact that America is a liberal democracy while China remains under authoritarian rule is a significant additional impetus for rivalry, an obstacle to stable, cooperative relations, and a source of mutual hostility and mistrust in its own right. Relations between democracies and nondemocracies are always conducted in what political theorist Michael Doyle describes as an “atmosphere of suspicion,” in part because of “the perception by liberal states that nonliberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people.” Democracies, in short, regard nondemocracies as less than legitimate because they do not enjoy the freely given consent of their own people. In their heart of hearts, most self-governing citizens simply do not believe that all states are created equal or that they are entitled to the same degree of respect regardless of how they are ruled. Seen in this light, disputes between the United States and China over such issues as censorship and religious freedom are not just superficial irritants that can be dissolved or wished away. They are instead symptomatic of much deeper difficulties. To most Americans, China’s human-rights violations are not only intrinsically wrong, they are also powerful indicators of the morally distasteful nature of the Beijing regime. While the United States may be able to do business with such a government on at least some issues, the possibility of a warm, trusting and stable relationship is remote to say the least.

## Not Zero Sum

### **US-China soft power is not zero sum – five reasons**

Nye and Jisi, '9 – Joseph S. Nye Jr. is the University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard. Wang Jisi is Dean of Peking University School of International Studies. (Harvard International Review. <http://hir.harvard.edu/agriculture/hard-decisions-on-soft-power?page=0,2>)

In their respective foreign policy pronouncements, Americans and Chinese often have opposite views and goals. While Americans want to maintain their leading position in global affairs, Chinese are opposing “hegemonism,” a code word for US ambitions to dominate the world, and are promoting “multipolarity,” signifying an apparent decline in US power. Nonetheless, the seemingly opposite goals and ambivalent feelings described above belie some very fundamental realities, according to which the soft power interaction between the United States and China is far from a zero-sum game. First, there is little evidence that the increase in China soft power is aimed at counterweighing US soft power, or that the “color revolutions,” regardless of their connection to US strategic objectives, are intended to work against China’s influence in those countries where they occurred. The tainted US image in Europe and the Islamic world has little to do with Chinese diplomacy there, and US unpopularity would not directly result in any boosting of China’s cultural and political influences. Just as Yao Ming is not in the United States at the expense of Michael Jordan, Hollywood movies and TV series like Desperate Housewives would do no harm to the quality of Chinese movies. Although some people in China may blame the popularity of American cultural products for reducing the attractiveness of Chinese counterparts, a reverse argument can be made that such competitions are needed and healthy. Similar cases can be found in China-US educational exchanges, in which each side benefits from better students and teachers of the other side. Second, the perception that the Chinese model of combining market economy with one-party rule (Beijing Consensus) will challenge the Western model (involving open markets, democracy, and rule of law) and values is dubious. More research should be done to find out how many, and to what extent, other developing countries are actually able to learn a great deal from the Chinese model, even if some of them do admire the Chinese performance. For what we know, Americans would be pleased should North Korea or Myanmar now begin to move toward the Chinese market economy. Third, China is using its soft power in diplomacy in ways that may help the United States protect its interests in certain countries and regions. To be sure, China’s actions are taken first of all to serve its own interests, but its quiet efforts to persuade the North Koreans to terminate their nuclear weapon programs and to embark on economic reform do facilitate US policy objectives on the Korean Peninsula. Likewise, Beijing’s quiet diplomacy to persuade Myanmar’s government to modify its behavior at home may pave the way for stabilizing the situation in that country. What is more, China has successfully convinced Khartoum to accept a UN presence in Sudan, which was originally rejected under Western pressures. Fourth, Chinese guardedness against US soft power is essentially defensive, especially in China’s domestic affairs. Despite their suspicions of US intentions and their doubts about the relevance of American experiences to China’s own path to modernity, Chinese political elites share the basic values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, as well as market economy. As a US analyst observed a few weeks after the 9/11 tragedy, “we used to emphasize that China and the United States hold different values. But if we compare the gap between American values and the values held by the Taliban and Al Qaeda, differences between China and the United States are negligible!” Finally, in reality Chinese are borrowing many skills and practices that undergird US soft power. A great number of Chinese government officials, military officers, judges, lawyers, among other professionals, have been trained in the United States, and they have made contributions to US knowledge as well. In the field of foreign policy, many Chinese think tanks have emerged in the last decade or so, and the examples they refer to are their counterparts in the United States, rather than those in Japan, Russia, or Germany. The soft-power interaction between the United States and China thus need not be seen as a competition, but rather as a more complex combination of competitive and cooperative forces. Conclusions It is not surprising to see Chinese leaders and academics referring explicitly to China’s soft power, and adopting policies to promote it. In a sense, this reflects a sophisticated realist strategy for a country with rising hard power. To the extent it is able to combine its hard power resources with soft power resources, it is less likely to frighten its neighbors and others and thus less likely to stimulate balancing coalitions directed against it. Successful strategies often involve a combination of hard and soft power that are called “smart power.” For example, in 19th century Europe, after defeating Denmark, Austria, and France with Prussian hard military power, Bismarck developed a soft power strategy of making Berlin the most attractive diplomatic capital of Europe. During the Cold War, the United States used both hard and soft power against the Soviet Union. Thus it is not surprising to see China following a smart power strategy. Whether this will be a problem for other countries or not will depend on the way the power is used. If China seeks to manipulate the politics of Asia and exclude the United States, its strategy could be counterproductive, but to the extent that China adopts the attitude of a rising “responsible stakeholder” in international affairs, its combination of hard and soft power can make a positive contribution. In return, much will depend upon the willingness of the United States to include China as an important player in the web of formal and informal international institutional arrangements. China is far from the United States’ or Europe’s equal in soft power at this point, but it would be foolish to ignore the important gains it is making. Fortunately, these gains can be good for China and also good for the rest of the world. Soft power is not a zero sum game in which one country’s gain is necessarily another country’s loss. If China and the United States, for example, both become more attractive in each others’ eyes, the prospects of damaging conflicts will be reduced. If the rise of China’s soft power reduces the chance of conflict, it can be part of a positive sum relationship.

## No Link - They'll Cooperate

### **Cooperation solves US – China relations and opens the door for further political talks**

Jeremiah O. **Klomp**, Major, USAF **10**, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, “IS SPACE BIG ENOUGH FOR A US-SINO PARTNERSHIP?” April 2010 Pg. 17

A key driver in any joint venture is the political implications of the proposed collaboration. Our political relationship with China is tenuous at best, with neither side trusting the other completely, and in general discord respecting sensitive matters, such as the Taiwan issue and human rights discussions. Any joint venture between the US and China, particularly in an area as sensitive as space, may be perceived as waffling on our part which may then be construed as a moral compromise. Jeffrey Logan, a specialist in Energy Policy in the Resources, Science and Industry Division, points out in a special report to Congress that “China is widely criticized for its record on human rights and non-democratic governance. Any collaboration that improves the standing of authoritarian Chinese leaders might thus be viewed as unacceptable.”<sup>15</sup> However, a joint venture in the name of science may help to reduce barriers and open further dialog into many areas that are currently strained. President Nixon’s so-called “Ping-pong politics,” or using non-contentious means to begin dialog in other areas, may be an effective way to open doors currently closed to US involvement.

### **US-China cooperation over space solves current tensions and boosts US soft-power.**

Rob W. **Chambers** Major, United States Air Force B.A., Chinese Language & Literature, *summa cum laude*, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, 1996 M.S., Strategic Intelligence, Joint Military Intelligence College, 2001, **2009** NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March 2009 “CHINA’S SPACE PROGRAM: A NEW TOOL FOR PRC “SOFT POWER” IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?” March 2009 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497039&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

On a more optimistic note, space cooperation between NASA and the CNSA, its Chinese counterpart, through increased contact and exchanges of information, could help overcome mutual mistrust and ambiguity. Over the long-term, it could potentially give way to strengthened confidence and assurance of each others’ intentions and concerns about space, reducing ambiguity and increasing transparency across the board. Even during the height of the Cold War, America held a joint space docking exercise with the Soviet Union in 1975 which “achieved important technical and political breakthroughs”.<sup>289</sup> If the United States could work with its bitter communist rival during the dark days of the Cold War, according to the “space partner” perspective, Washington could safely find a place for Sino-U.S. space cooperation in the 21st century. Working in a more direct fashion with the Chinese, it could be argued, may also help keep their space program directed at peaceful objectives and dampen any secret ambitions to militarize outer space. Even some Chinese scholars would agree on this point, including Wu Chunsi from Fudan University’s Center for American Studies. He suggests that Washington’s active engagement China in space could help create a clean break between the civilian and military programs and that “the commercial and civilian elements of China’s space program will see their capabilities grow along with a sense of *independence from the military*”.<sup>290</sup> Furthermore, Wu argues, “if China follows a path of isolation, exclusion will only deepen its suspicion and resentment, and the commercial and civilian sectors...would be forced to seek help from the government, or even the military”.<sup>291</sup> Thus, instead of acting as a “space hyper-power,” a U.S. invitation to the Chinese to become a space partner could arguably soften its image as a global hegemon, and also increase U.S. soft power and credibility with the Chinese.<sup>292</sup>

## No Impact – China wouldn't be a fight

**No risk of U.S.-China war – the PRC knows it would get crushed in a conflict and would need to build up its military for more than 10 years to stand a chance.**

**Bandow 3-7-08** (Doug, former senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former columnist with Copley News Service. "Turning China into the Next Big Enemy." <http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=12472>) But the Defense Department is even more worried that the Chinese are spending too much, which is essentially defined as developing a military which one day could confront American forces – successfully. It's a fair concern, since Beijing's military build-up is transforming the international environment far more quickly than most American analysts had expected. The PRC has numerous reasons for seeking to create a superior military. The Pentagon notes that China probably is developing forces for use in such contingencies "as conflict over resources or disputed territories." Moreover, Beijing's growing "capabilities will increase Beijing's options for military coercion to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes in its favor." As Washington well knows, international political influence is more likely to follow a larger military. Russia has regained regional clout, but remains a smaller global player; Europe is an economic giant but a military midget. Beijing seems intent on twinning soft and hard power to enhance its global clout. Despite the multiple ends, however, the PRC appears to have two more basic goals with its military build-up. The first is to enable the PRC to compel Taiwan, through use of military force, if necessary, to accept some form of reunification. The second is to deter the U.S. from intervening to stop China from using coercion. As the Pentagon observes, "A potential military confrontation with Taiwan, and the prospect of U.S. military intervention, remain the PLA's most immediate military concerns." Indeed, much of the PRC's military program seems directed at creating a credible deterrent to America. The Pentagon reports: "China's nuclear force modernization, as evidenced by the fielding of the new DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental-range missiles, is enhancing China's strategic strike capabilities. China's emergent anti-access/area denial capabilities – as exemplified by its continued development of advanced cruise missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles designed to strike ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, and the January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon – are expanding from the land, air, and sea dimensions of the traditional battlefield into the space and cyber-space domains." It's an impressive list. But America's military capabilities remain far greater. Why does the PRC need anti-ship missiles for use against aircraft carriers? Because it lacks even one carrier, while the U.S. controls the seas with 12 carrier groups. This country dominates most other military fields as well. America's nuclear missile arsenal is much bigger, more sophisticated, and more deadly than that possessed by China. Washington already is reaching into space with its missile defense program. Thus, the PRC is seeking to deter America from deploying its more powerful forces. Notes the Pentagon, "Through analysis of U.S and coalition warfighting practices since 1991, Beijing hopes to develop approaches to waging future conflict by adapting and emulating lessons learned in some areas while seeking perceived vulnerabilities that could be exploited through asymmetric means in others." In particular, "As part of its planning for a Taiwan contingency, China is prioritizing measures to deter or counter third-party intervention in any future cross-Strait crisis." Thus, Beijing might be preparing to confront the U.S. But the critical question is, confront the U.S. over what? If Beijing was plotting the conquest of Guam, Hawaii, and ultimately the North American continent, then Beijing's ongoing military build-up would look dangerous indeed. But there is nothing in China's long history that suggests such overarching ambitions. Unwilling to remain weak and thus subject to coercion by a trigger-happy superpower across the Pacific. Yes. Determined to vigorously assert its perceived interests. Yes. Expecting international respect and consultation that reflects its increasingly expansive interests and growing power. Yes. Ready to commit global aggression, initiate world war, and wreck both China's and America's futures. No. Which means the U.S. should think carefully before responding to China's ongoing build-up. The Pentagon speaks of a situation which "will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown," meaning Washington will need to spend even more on the military. If half of the world's military outlays aren't enough, one wonders how much would be. Two-thirds? Three-fourths? Even more? Washington should not fret. If the goal is defending America, the U.S. possesses sufficiency today. Just catching up with the U.S. will be a daunting task for the PRC. Explained the Pentagon: "The U.S. Intelligence Community estimates China will take until the end of this decade or longer to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size adversary. China will not be able to project and sustain small military units far beyond China before 2015, and will not be able to project and sustain large forces in combat operations far from China until well into the following decade." Washington already occupies the global summit, with the enormous military infrastructure of a superpower. China will not easily displace America with the world's most powerful military. Assume that China, still desperately poor and surrounded by potentially hostile states, decides to deploy one new carrier group a year, no mean task. The PRC still wouldn't match America until 2020. Even then Beijing wouldn't be strong enough to take aggressive action against the U.S. homeland or dependencies. To develop an air force capable of dominating U.S. airspace and ground forces capable of invading U.S. territory would be another step well beyond. Most important, the U.S. possesses what would remain an effective nuclear deterrent against almost any imaginable Chinese missile force. It's not that the PRC couldn't theoretically construct and deploy more and better nuclear missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear-armed subs than the U.S., though such a process would take an enormous commitment over many years. But it's hard to imagine that China could ever deploy enough to create a first strike capability.